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The main aim of the paper is to display and analyse both the revenue and the 
expenditure side of the future budget which came to light in the Commission 
proposal concerning the EU new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) of 
2014-2020. Efforts were also made to clarify the interests lying behind claims 
and different behaviour of the member states vis-￠-vis the common European 
budget. All available EU documents on MFF were exploited, especially those 
published concerning the Commission proposal at the end of June 2011. As a 
very  interesting  observation,  it  was  revealed  that  the  Commission  proposal 
rather favours  the  old  and/or  developed  member  states  than the  new  and/or 
underdeveloped ones. Considering the amount of efforts needed to surmount the 
crisis and to stabilise public finances, considering in addition the weakening 
propensity  of  net  contributors  to  the  budget  (especially  that  of  Germany)  to 
place EU-cooperation before their own national interests, it is to be feared that 
the next MFF will not be the one to accelerate the catching-up process of the 
less developed regions of Europe.    
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The European Commission put forward its proposal concerning the EU 
new Multiannual Financial Framework (herein after referred to as MFF) for the 
seven year period of 2014-2020 at the end of the Hungarian presidency, in the 
evening of June 29, 2011. Introducing the proposal in such notoriously debatable 
and divisive issue as the EU budget so close to the summer holiday was perhaps 
not quite unintentional, as the Commission could expect to attract less attention, 
but severe criticism and harsh reactions did not take long to emerge. 
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Following a short historical background, containing a couple of words on 
the size of the would-be MFF, I shall try to display and analyse both the revenue 
and the expenditure side of the proposed budget, which will constitute the two 
main chapters of this paper. I shall also try to clarify the interests lying behind 
claims and different behaviour of the member states, with special focus on those 
of the new ones on one side, and the most powerful ones, like Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom, on the other.  
When preparing this article  I exploited all available EU documents on 
MFF, especially those published about the Commission proposal at the end of 
June 2011. I also made good use of such valuable volumes as Szeml￩r’s book  
dealing with the expectations of new member states for the next MFF (Szeml￩r, 
2010), another one, edited again by Szeml￩r but this time together with Eriksson, 
mapping the positions of a couple of old and new members on the same topic 
(Szeml￩r and Eriksson, 2008), as well as studies by Zerka (2011), Begg (2010) 
or Brehon (2010). I could certainly not ignore either the hot reactions of member 
states representatives on the Commission proposal or the harmonised positions 
of some net contributors to the EU budget.  
 
2. Historical background 
Unlike  in  the  periods  preceding  the  Commission’s  preparation  and 
unveiling of proposals for the forthcoming MFFs, for the last one and a half 
year, there were almost no or very few clues as to what the current proposal 
would contain. Only one thing was fairly sure: that, as stipulated by the Lisbon 
Treaty,  the  next  MFF  should  not  be  shorter  than  five  years.  Under  these 
circumstances  one  could  not  but  rely  on  some  official  papers  reflecting  the 
opinion of the European bodies and decision-makers.  
The first such paper was the Commission’s document called Europe 2020, 
published in early March 2010, in which all targets and initiatives were set out 
with  the  aim  of  fighting  against  poverty,  unemployment,  premature  school-
leaving, climate change and fostering knowledge based economy, but in which 
the word “cohesion” was mentioned only twice, and the expression “common 
agricultural policy” not at all.
69 
Only a couple of weeks later, a second clue was provided by the so-called 
“Conclusions” of the European Council (EC) pursuant to its meeting held on 25-
26 March 2010 in Brussels.
70 In stark contrast to the overall mood of the above-
mentioned  Commission’s  paper,  the  EC  document  stood  up  for  both  the 
cohesion and the common agricultural policy (CAP), declaring them necessary 
for the support of the new strategy (i.e. the Europe 2020 Strategy). 
As  a  third  official  paper,  one  can  mention  the  Commission’s  Budget 
Review  published,  after  several  years  of  procrastination,  in  the  middle  of 
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October  2010.
71  The reasons for successive postponement were manifold  – 
delays in institutional reforms, outburst of the financial and economic crisis and 
of the debt crisis in the Euro Zone – all pushing the Commission to defer the 
publication of its review to an ever later date, in order to spare member states 
from having to deal with such an undoubtedly sensitive and contentious topic as 
the EU budget at a time when unity was a must. As a matter of fact, the Budget 
Review came too late and was too general in its recommendations, repeating 
only  well-known  ideas  in  an  actualised  context  (e.g.  simplification  and 
modernisation  of  the  common  budget,  as  well  as  bringing  it  closer  to  the 
citizens), but all this interested no one but the European Parliament. Everyone 
else was looking forward the Commission proposal for the new MFF, finally 
tabled, as already mentioned, at the end of June 2011.  
 As a reflection of how important for the member states the whole issue 
was, in December 2010, leaders of five net contributors to the budget (France, 
Germany, the UK, Finland and the Netherlands) wrote a common letter to the 
Commission President, Jos￩ Manuel Barroso, in which they insisted on the fact 
that the increase of the EU expenditure had to come to a halt.
72 Precisely, they 
warned that appropriations for payments should not increase more rapidly than 
annual inflation and those for commitments should not exceed the level foreseen 
for 2013, adjusted with less than annual inflation for the whole MFF to come.
73  
Finally, just a couple of weeks before the Commission proposal was due 
to come out, the European Parliament (EP) issued a challenge to those member 
states who wanted to freeze the MFF. On the basis of a special committee report, 
the EP worked out a resolution  – which was adopted on 8 June 2011 by 468 
votes to 134, with 54 abstentions – calling for an increase by at least 5 per cent 
in the next MFF in order to complete the objectives and policies agreed for the 
EU 2020 Strategy.
74  
When the paper “Budget for Europe 2020” came to light
75, it seemed that 
the Commission had mostly taken into account the views of the EP, as in its 
proposal for MFF 2014-2020, the total EU spending would rise to €972 billion 
in payments, with €1,025 billion pledged in commitments, both representing, in 
real terms, an increase of exactly 5 per cent over the previous period. But if these 
figures were measured in terms of Gross National Income (GNI), there would 
practically be no change, for with current MFF (2007-2013), which had been 
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decided upon in late 2005
76, appropriations for commitments represent 1.045 per 
cent and those for payments 0.99 percent of total EU GNI, while the respective 
figures of the proposal for MFF 2014-2020 are 1.05 and 1.00 per cent.  
Nevertheless, it is also true that that part of the EU  expenditure which is 
outside the common budget has been augmented by a tiny extra expenditure 
representing a mere 0.0124 per cent of the EU GNI. This extra spending stems 
from two sources: from taking some of the existing programs where the costs are 
too large to be borne only by the EU budget like ITER
77 and GMES
78 out of, and 
from introducing a new instrument to react to crisis situations in agriculture 
outside the MFF.  
Together  with  some  other  headings  –  responding  to  crises  and 
emergencies  (like  the  Emergency  Aid  Reserve,  the  European  Globalisation 
Fund, the Solidarity Fund and the Flexibility Instrument) representing 0.016 per 
cent of the EU GNI, or having always been financed outside the budget (like the 
European Development Fund) representing another 0.031 per cent – the total 
figure  for  potential  EU  spending  would  rise  to  a  yearly  1.06  per  cent  for 
payments and 1.11 per cent for commitments. 
The above changes would be too significant for those striving to bring 
public finances under control, and quite disappointing for those looking forward 
to a budget being more in line with goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Presently, 
the former group seems to be the one better organised. On 12 September 2011, 
as  a  first  move  of  co-ordinated  response  to  Commission  proposal,  the 
governments  of  eight  member  states  (those  of  France,  Germany,  Austria, 
Finland, Italy, Sweden, the UK and the Netherlands) issued a common statement 
in which they considered the planned expenditure to be too high in a time when 
many EU members had to undertake serious austerity measures.
79 
To overcome such a discontentment will not be an easy task for the 
Commission who keeps saying that the increase is not that high if one also takes 
changes on the revenue side into account.   
 
3. The revenue side of the MFF 
According to Article 269 of the EU Treaty, the common “budget shall be 
financed  wholly  from  own  resources”
80.  From  the  early  1970s,  Brussels 
collected  own  resources  originating  from  common  policies  (like  customs  or 
agricultural policy) completed if necessary by a standard percentage levied on 
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the harmonised VAT base of each member state. From the early 1990s, however, 
the autonomy of these resources has been gradually undermined by the return to 
the method in use at the beginning of the European integration process, i.e. to 
national contributions based more or less on member states affluence, measured 
today in GNI. Hence, the current structure of the EU budget seems to be closer 
to  that  of  an  intergovernmental  organisation  than  a  well-advanced  economic 
integration.  
In order to remedy such a situation on the expenditure side of the common 
budget, the Commission proposes three main novelties: 
-  the simplification  of  member state  contributions, i.e.  the  abolition  of the 
current VAT-based resource. Considered to be too complex and requiring 
too significant an intervention in order to arrive at a harmonised base, its 
abolition would reduce the administrative burden on member states; 
-  the introduction of two new own resources: 
o  a financial transaction tax (FTT) which, in order to reduce the risk 
of market disruption, would be imposed at very low rates (e.g. 0.1 per cent 
for bonds and shares, and 0.01 per cent on derivative products); 
o  a new, modernised VAT resource to be applied (e.g. at a rate of 1 
per  cent)  on  those  goods  and  services  only  which  are  subject  to  the 
standard rate in each and every member state; 
−  the reform of the correction mechanisms: 
o  the  proposal  puts  an  end  to  all  country-specific  corrections 
(including the most famous one, that of the UK) and replaces them with a 
new system of lump sum gross reductions on yearly GNI payments for 
Germany  (€2,500  million),  Sweden  (€350  million),  the  UK  (€3,600 
million) and the Netherlands (€1,050 million);  
o  the proposal brings back the rate of retention, by way of collection 
costs, of 25 per cent of the amounts of traditional own resources (almost 
exclusively  customs  duties)  collected  by  the  member  states  and 
considered to be a hidden correction mechanism, to 10 per cent, its level 
in place until 2000. 
 By the Commission’s calculations, all the above changes – apart from 
simplifying  the  contribution  and  reducing  the  administrative  burden  for  the 
member  states  –  should  considerably  increase  the  revenue  coming  from  the 
traditional own resources, the VAT-based resource and the new FTT-resource. 
All together, these revenues should rise from a yearly €33.8 billion in 2012 to 
€97.3 billion in 2020, thereby reducing the need for member states to complete 
the common budget by way of transferring money proportional to their GNI by 
more than €32 billion.
81 According to the Commission proposal for a Council 
decision on the own resources system, this would give extra room for manoeuvre 
to the member states general budgetary consolidation. 
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When  trying  to  identify  the  possible  responses  to  the  Commission 
proposal, the following points emerge: 
-  first, claiming that new taxes would reduce the member states’ burdens is a 
mere  smokescreen,  as  any  Euros  will  first  be  collected  by  national 
governments and then handed over to Brussels, hence no longer available for 
being spent at home;   
-  secondly, according to an old principle – already laid down e.g. in Magna 
Charta – there is no taxation without representation. However simple the 
new VAT-based tax may look, it would be seen as an extra burden and thus, 
will likely be very unpopular. In addition, by eliminating the current VAT-
based resource an essential data for the calculation of the UK rebate would 
no longer be available which could affect the British approach to the new 
VAT-resource; 
-  third, although taxing the financial transactions seems nowadays to be very 
popular, a unilateral initiative in this field could put big European financial 
centres (including the City of London) at great risk, thus such a novelty is 
questionable if not done globally; 
-  finally, most member countries are against any sort of correction mechanism 
seen as an obvious manifestation of the so widely condemned “juste retour” 
mentality. Maintaining such mechanisms, even if in a simplified form, may 
trigger significant protest.  
Besides, the British, who managed to get back a yearly average of €5,400 
million  form  the  EU  budget  over  the  period  2003-2009  –  enabling  them  to 
maintain their operating net balance in a pretty good situation compared with 
other  developed  member  states  (see  Table  1),  –  for  the  simple  reason  this 
specific  mechanism  happens  to  be  part  of the  resources  system  –  have  veto 
power  over  their  own  rebate.  Having  this  in  mind,  they  will  never  agree  to 
reduce their money unless a radical change is made in the first pillar of the 
common agricultural policy (CAP). The British have always been saying the 
CAP  gives  no  value  for  member  states  money,  hence  it  is  deserved  to  be 
dismantled, which is the only way London would accept the rebate be removed. 
But,  it  seems  to  be  reasonable  to  examine  whether  the  British  are  really 
interested in sacrificing their rebate against the destruction of the CAP. For, in 
the period 2003-2009, there was an average difference of € 1.77 billion between 
the CAP net cost for the UK in case of no rebate and the rebate itself, the latter 
having the bigger numerical value.
82 So, the British would only sacrifice the 
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rebate to getting rid of the CAP if they were able to restructure the spending side 
of the EU budget in a way which would compensate them for at least the lost 
amount.  
With this,  we can  turn  our  attention to the  spending  side  of the MFF 
where the Commission also proposed justifications with the intention to calm 
those dissatisfied down.  
Table 1. Operating budgetary balances (measured in national GNI) 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Belgium  -0.28%  -0.18%  -0.20%  -0.22%  -0.26%  -0.21%  -0.49% 
Germany  -0.35%  -0.32%  -0.27%  -0.27%  -0.30%  -0.35%  -0.26% 
France  -0.12%  -0.18%  -0.17%  -0.17%  -0.16%  -0.20%  -0.30% 
Italy  -0.06%  -0.21%  -0.15%  -0.12%  -0.13%  -0.27%  -0.34% 
Netherlands  -0.40%  -0.40%  -0.51%  -0.47%  -0.50%  -0.46%  0.02% 
Austria  -0.15%  -0.16%  -0.12%  -0.12%  -0.21%  -0.13%  -0.15% 
Sweden  -0.34%  -0.37%  -0.29%  -0.27%  -0.29%  -0.43%  -0.03% 
UK  -0.14%  -0.16%  -0.08%  -0.11%  -0.20%  -0.05%  -0.12% 
Source: Commission, 2011c 
 
4. The spending side of the MFF 
The Commission’s opinion is that the increase in MFF funds is not that 
unacceptable if one considers the following changes: 
-  the Commission intends to impose an austerity package on its own staff. It 
would involve getting rid of (i.e. pensioned off or let go when contracts 
expire) 5 per cent of the officials (circa 2,500 functionaries) over a five year 
period from 2013 onward. The remaining staff would work longer (40 hours 
a week instead of the current 37.5), would only be allowed to retire later (at 
the  age  of  65  instead  of 63)  and  would  see  the  number  of  their  special 
holidays disguised as official visits to their home countries reduced from 6 
days a year to 2. The complete package could save €1 billion a year; 
-  with a view to reaching the headline Europe 2020 target of 3 per cent of 
GDP, €80 billion is proposed to be dedicated to research and development 
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within a newly created strategic common framework closely linked to key 
sectoral  policy  priorities  such  as  health,  food  security  and  bio-economy, 
energy and climate change. It would in this way be brought together the 
existing three research and innovation instruments, i.e. the 7
th Framework 
Programme,  the  Competitiveness  and  Innovation  Framework  Programme 
and the European Institute for Innovation and Technology; 
-  significant amount of new money, a sum of more than €15 billion, would be 
spent  to  strengthen  Community  programs  for  education  and  vocational 
training; 
-  in order to provide better access to the internal market and put an end to the 
isolation of certain economic areas, a new subheading named Connecting 
Europe Facility would be created with a budget-line of €40 billion, to be 
supplemented  by  €10  billion  from  the  Cohesion  Fund.  This  money  is 
intended to fill persistent gaps, remove bottlenecks and ensure cross-border 
connections in the field of transport, energy and information technology; 
-  although the original concept of creating specific instruments dedicated to 
climate  and  environment  was  eventually  ruled  out  for  fear  of  creating 
overlaps with cohesion and agricultural policy, climate-related expenditure 
can easily amount to about 20 per cent of MFF expenditure. Policy actions 
of this type will be scattered across the budget and streamlined into all major 
EU funding instruments.  
-  When evaluating the Commission’s conception of the spending side of the 
MFF, a very interesting observation emerges: most of the proposed changes 
favour the old and/or developed member states. For example: 
-  there is a significant increase of funds for research and education, sectors 
where the old members have comparative advantages, huge capacity and 
also a propensity for brain-drain from the new member states; 
-  as  far  as  the  future  infrastructural  projects  falling  under  the  Connecting 
Europe  Facility  are  concerned,  most  of  the  designing  and  construction 
capacity happens to be concentrated in the hands of big Western European 
firms; 
-  in the case of the old policies, like cohesion and agricultural policy, being 
more in line with the needs of new and/or underdeveloped members, there is 
clear decline in real terms of the corresponding funds. In case of the CAP for 
example, its current two-pillar structure, as well as the nominal value of its 
subsidies, would be maintained which means in real terms a reduction of 
circa 12-13 per cent between 2013 and 2020; 
-  what is more, with the aim of sharpening the focus on results rather than 
inputs, conditionality would be introduced into programs. Hence, the above 
mentioned  funds  would  not  only  be  reduced  but  also  more  and  more 
conditional on such things as performance or “greening”.  
o  the most striking example is the possible linkage of 30 per 
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action objectives, well beyond the cross-compliance requirements of the 
current legislation. It is very easy to imagine that in old member states, 
where several decades of massive CAP subsidies resulted in a sufficiently 
high technological level, farmers are closer to being able to satisfy such 
conditions than those in the new member states; 
−  the idea  of  capping  the  CAP  direct  payments  for  the  largest agricultural 
holdings also seems to do more harm to the new than to the old members 
which is due to the dual structure of the agricultural sector inherited from the 
communist  past.    The  countries  most  affected  by  a  future  capping  are 
Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The only good news within the 
CAP is the planned progressive adjustment of the levels of direct payments 
(DPs): all members where DPs are below 90 per cent of the EU-27 average 
would see the gap between their current level and the mentioned 90 per cent 
level  to  be  closed  by  one  third  by  2020.    This  convergence  would  be 
financed by member states with DPs above EU-27 average; 
o  here, I venture a comment on the interests of the two leader 
countries of the European integration, on those of France and Germany. 
Let us start with the latter. Although the plan for capping the DPs for the 
largest agricultural holdings would, especially in the Eastern provinces, 
affect Germany too, Berlin would no longer accept to be blackmailed or to 
place the EU-cooperation before its own national interests. For decades, 
the  Germans  have  not  done  too  much  for  preventing  the  regular 
reproduction  of  their  deficit  vis-￠-vis  the  EU-budget,  the  accumulated 
amount of which totalled €200 billion between 1981 and 2000. Behind 
this behaviour one could find political reasons and the fact that in other 
areas of the European integration, e.g. the single market, they could easily 
earn back what they lost in the common budget. Since the reunification, 
however,  their  motivation  for  making  compromises  has  gradually 
weakened. Not only the other relatively well-off old members states but 
also  the  new  ones  have  to  become  familiar  with  this  new  stance  of 
Germany  and  increase  their  part  in  the  burden  sharing  within  the  EU 
budget; 
o  as for France, due to the significant subsidies obtained from 
the CAP, Paris had for decades enjoyed a privileged position of being 
only  a  moderate  net  contributor:  between  1981  and  2000,  its  average 
annual deficit was only one sixth of that of Germany. But, this state of 
grace came to an end with the Agenda 2000. Since 2002 onwards, France 
has recorded a sharp increase in both its contribution to and its net balance 
vis-￠-vis  the  common  budget.  By  the  end  of  the  current  financial 
framework  (2007-2013),  France’s  net  position  will  have  been  quite 
comparable with that of Germany
83. This process has already gone so far 
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that, taking it from a strictly bookkeeping approach, France’s annual net 
benefit out of the CAP is, for the time being, clearly less than its part in 
the financing of the British rebate (see Graph 1). So, seen from Paris, to 
dismantle  the  CAP  for  the  sake  of  getting  rid  of  the  rebate  is  not  an 
impossible  option  anymore.  Hence,  the  new  member  states  cannot  be 
certain  to  get  France’s  support  for  maintaining  a  strong  European 
agricultural policy for ever. Under the circumstances of the financial and 
economic crisis and given the relatively high agricultural and food prices 
which are expected to last for quite long, the CAP is prone to be cut 
anyhow;  
Graph  1.  Net  balance  of  CAP  against  the  cost  of  the  British  rebate  for 
France 
 
Source: Commission 2010c, own calculations 
 
−  now, after this short digression, let us get back to that observation whereby 
most  of  the  proposed  changes  favour  the  old  and/or  developed  member 
states. In the cohesion policy, the introduction of a new category of regions, 
that of  “transition regions” with GDP per capita between 75 and 90 per cent 
of the EU-27 average, would replace the current phasing-out and phasing in 
system. This seems to favour the poorest regions in the old member states 
rather than the very few rich regions in the new ones. Comparing the support 
available  under  cohesion  policy  for  the  different  categories  of  region, 
support for the poorest (the so-called convergence) regions goes from €30.7 
billion in 2013 to €24.4 billion in 2020. The same figures for the two other 
categories are as follows: from €2.0 billion to €5.6 billion for the transition 
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o  Cutting back the cohesion policy envelope for the relatively poorer 
regions of Europe is all the more regrettable as cohesion policy has always 
been a positive-sum game, with beneficial effects both in recipient and net 
contributor  countries.  According  to  researchers’  calculation,  cohesion 
projects  developed  in  Poland  in  the  period  of  2004-2015  may  have 
important  positive  externalities,  largely  compensating  for  the  costs 
incurred  by  EU-15.  “Every  single  euro  spent  on  cohesion  in  Poland 
should earn them (i.e. the EU-15) … around 36 cents back in additional 
exports  of  goods  and  services….Germany  turns  out  to  be  the  biggest 
beneficiary of Polish cohesion, receiving…72…cents back.” (Zerka, 2011, 
p.5) In the long run, beneficial effects may involve an increase of imports 
stemming from the modernisation of the recipient country’s economy and 
the growing wealth of its citizens; 
−  finally, the intention of the Commission to concentrate the available money 
onto the smallest possible number of big projects, claiming that they can 
deliver higher European added value than scattering the money among a lot 
of small projects, principally penalizes the smallest and poorest economies 
(i.e. most of the new member states). Since these projects need to be co-
financed  from  the  national  budgets,  they  divert  scarce  national  resources 
from the development of the still incomplete basic national infrastructure. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The Commission will lay out its legislative proposals in detail before the 
end of 2011. The member states will have time to agree with them by the end of 
2012. The European Parliament also has a say: concerning the MFF, the consent 
of  the  majority  of  EP  constituent  members  is  required,  while  for  the  own 
resource system only EP consultation is called for. 
Considering  the  amount  of  efforts  needed,  at  least  on  the  short  and 
medium run, to face and deal with the financial, economic and Euro Zone crisis 
and to stabilize the public finances, one can hardly believe that enough attention, 
spirit,  energy  and  determination  could  be  gathered  in  order  for  the  new 
Multiannual Financial Framework to be able to answer the real needs of the 
member states, or to make a substantial contribution to achieving the goals of the 
Europe 2020 Strategy. It is very likely that the current structure will more or less 
be preserved, with somewhat less money being made available for the Common 
Agricultural Policy and hence for the British rebate, and the whole budget will 
be set at the lowest possible level. It is to be feared that the next MFF will not be 
the one to accelerate the catching-up process of the less developed regions of 
Europe.   
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